Referendum(s) and their Consequences


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"Referendum", apparently has no alternative spelling. We are advised that, "as a Latin gerund, referendum has no plural"although in English the preferred option is 'referendums'. Literally from the the Latin it means 'taking (an issue) back to the people'. 

We may discover, that although seemingly desirable and effective as a method of obtaining the public will in any matter, its consequences can be proscriptive and unsatisfactory. Rather than settling issues and providing uniformity, its result can be quite the opposite. Division, on-going controversy and even violence as recently demonstrated in the Ukraine and Spain, can result, with neither side content with the outcome.

Referendums are currently much in the news; their political and social consequences significant. The decision to implement them tends to be taken by government as a strategic ploy to advance or resist political demands. There is no guarantee that it will go the way desired or expected by those agreeing to it, as was demonstrated by the recent Scottish Independence and BREXIT votes. 

In practice it decides nothing because public opinion is fickle and changes wildly with personality, argument and circumstance. A decision one way on a certain day might theoretically be reversed on the next. Majorities come and go and Yes/No votes seldom reflect the complications and consequences sufficiently well for a properly informed decision. Nevertheless, the idea of the simple majority has the power to carry all before it. 

There are probably many who might wish this were not so, particularly where the margin one way or another is a narrow one. Perhaps in the matter of major constitutional change something more than a simple majority should be required, such as setting the percentage bar higher or requiring the ratification of Parliament?

We may conclude that the Scottish Referendum was marginally more decisive (55.3/44.7%) not to leave the UK than it was for the UK to leave the EU (51.9/48.11%) but subsequent shifts already indicate there may may be change if repeated today. The SNP lost 21 of its 56 Parliamentary seats in the 2017 General Election. The complications of leaving the EU may have persuaded many that it is not worth the ensuing uncertainty and dangers to trade.

Contrary to expectation, the leave vote carried the day in the BREXIT vote, but arguably if left to Parliament, we would remain in. Only the fact of the binding effect of the BREXIT vote and the difficulty of squaring it with the principle of democratic decision making, prevents them from doing so. Very unwisely, the Government made virtually no provision for exit well advance of the vote, which may have either influenced the outcome or have placed the nation in a far better position to negotiate when the time came. 

The situation may be summed up as "divisive". The nation is divided; Parliament is divided; the political parties are divided; the Government is divided; the Cabinet is divided; the negotiators are divided. "An house divided against itself cannot stand." It would be highly surprising if those representing the EU haven't noticed this parlous state of the British position and take advantage of it.

We are yet to see if a genuine break does in fact take place. The EU certainly is not facilitating it. The uncharitable might regard their negotiating position to be not far short of blackmail, demanding first a huge ransom before allowing the captive to escape with a promise of a future preferential trade relationship. Mrs May in her recent Florence speech indicated she may be prepared to countenance regular payments for at least two years whilst the up and coming Rees Mogg has argued it would be foolish to do so without firm concessions from the other side. It is hard not to agree with him.

As the second biggest net contributor (after Germany) to EU finances, the loss of Britain's membership would have significant consequences for the EU budget. Either expenditure would have to be drastically cut or contributions by the remaining 37 member states would have to rise. This, particularly for the poorer eastern and southern states may prove hard practically and politically. It may even encourage to others following Britain's example, an eventuality EU leaders are obviously anxious to avoid. 

And although Britain is not part of the Monetary Union, the economic uncertainty caused by it leaving could have detrimental consequences for the Euro and the pound - as to some extent it already has. For some fragile economies such as Greece, it could precipitate an exit from the Euro at least and others might follow. Of course all of this could undermine the very concept of European Political union. Thus playing for time may be the preferred option for both sides, whilst in public maintaining that separation was still the goal.

What if for example the EU were to come up with concessions along the lines of those proposed by Cameron a couple of years ago? Would they be enough to persuade Parliament and the people that leaving was a bad idea and that a second referendum was now required? There are certainly plenty of precedents for a second and reversing vote. 

In June 1992 Denmark narrowly (50.7%) voted against the Maastricht Treaty that provided for greater integration. The next year this was reversed in a second vote with 56.7% in favour. In 2001, Ireland voted 53.9% to reject Constitutional changes consequent on the Treaty of Nice. Next year this was reversed by a 62.9% vote in favour.  In 2008 this story was repeated with Ireland voting 53.2% against the Treaty of Lisbon, to be reversed the next year by 67.1%. 

In 2005 both France and the Netherlands returned negative votes (respectively 54.7% and 61.5%) but this did nothing to prevent the European experiment from proceeding on course. In 2015/16 no less than four EU members (Greece, Denmark on two issues, Holland and UK) rejected proposals. Dissatisfaction with the concept of a United States of Europe appears to be growing.

In 1985 Greenland departed the Union following a 53% vote in favour three years before. In 1972 Norway voted not to join (53.5%) and has remained stubbornly outside ever since. This, in respect of both oil and fisheries, has very much worked in its favour and it now has one of the highest standards of living on the continent. In many ways its situation may be compared and contrasted directly. Mrs Thatcher was saved by North Sea oil and gas but were the proceeds used prudently?

Whether these precedents can be projected onto the current British situation is yet to be decided. There are obviously parallels and differences that must be distinguished but much depends on the negotiating position of the EU, anxious to head off further desertions, protect its income, whilst presumably protecting mainland exports to to the UK, where there is a considerable trade balance in its favour.

Referendums are currently being carried out in an effort to decide independence issues as far afield as the Catalan province of Spain and the Kurdistan region of Iraq. In both cases it reflects longstanding aspirations and is opposed by the respective national governments which are faced with a tactical dilemma: oppose it too harshly and it may drive the people into the separation camp; treat it with apathy and the same result might follow. 

In both cases a vote to separate leads almost inevitably to complications and trouble, up to and including military confrontation. For this is essentially to do with the issues of sovereignty and political cohesion over a geographical area and who has ultimate control of policy, particularly the rich pickings of natural resources. One state's gain is inevitably another state's loss.

Barcelona and its region is relatively prosperous and subsidises the rest of Spain. It is therefore attractive to the region to sever its ties with Madrid and equally abhorred by the central government. Spanish autonomy is apparently non negotiable. In the case of Kurdistan, the location of valuable oil fields, is as unpopular with Ankara as it is with Baghdad, whilst supported by Israel/American long term Balkanisation' planning.

Back home, the Scottish Referendum went in the British Government's direction but it was a close run thing and many on both sides held their breath for different reason. Rather than settling the issue however, it was used by the nationalists, now significantly represented in the Westminster Parliament, to gain additional concessions for devolution powers. Maybe the political tide has turned with Conservative and Labour gains in the most recent and unexpected general election, particularly if the Corbyn-led Labour Party wins back its historic vote.

So now Britain (and Europe) has to wrestle with the consequences of yet another referendum on its membership of the European Union - an issue that has been simmering in political circles for thirty years at least. Conservative Ted Heath took us in without a referendum after De Gaulle had earlier famously said "Non". 

Wilson in 1974 submitted continuing membership to a referendum vote that gave a majority to remain. Britain was never enthusiastically in favour, most iconically portrayed by Mrs Thatcher's handbag diplomacy, demanding a rebate. Yet progress to more political integration continued with treaty signings in Maastrich and Lisbon. Reflecting a majority trend, the writer voted for in 74 and against in 2016.

Just as Wilson's promise that a devaluation of sterling would not affect the "pound in your pocket" was shown to be a misrepresentation, so Heath's promise that joining the EU would not affect British sovereignty, was equally so. It was demonstrated by Lord Justice Denning's 1972 finding that all domestic law was now subservient to that of European law and the decisions of the European Court of Justice. This was parallelled by treaty making the Court of Human Rights the ultimate arbiter of ethical issues.

Perhaps rather ironically it was Britain that argued in favour of the 2004 expansion to allow a further ten states to join taking the total to twenty-eight and the lax conditions that applied to the movement of people that was to prove critically damaging to the UK's support as millions flooded into the country from the new mainly eastern member states. Political apathy to it, linked to other revelations of impropriety, within the context of financial melt-down in 2008, probably did as much damage to Parliamentary democracy as it did to the European ideal. 

Paradoxically the public has now voted for greater independence and sovereignty for domestic institutions despite their obvious weaknesses and limitations outside the pan-European treaties. Whether this will enhance individual freedoms or strengthen the UK economy, awaits to be seen. The greatest dangers to both are not necessarily to be found abroad.



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